Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

In the Matter of the Estate of Edward Miller
Grimm, Deceased. Maxine Tate Grimm,
individually and as Supervised Personal
Representative of the Estate of Edward Miller
Grimm; Linda Grimm; Edward Miller Grimm II;
and E. Lavar Tate, as Supervised Personal
Representative of the Estate of Edward Miller
Grimm v. Ethel Grimm Roberts, Rex Roberts,
Follow
this andGrimm
additional works
at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Juanita
Morris
and Juanita Kegley Grimm :
Part of the Law Commons
Petition
for Writ of Certiorari
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Utah Supreme Court
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Brent Stephens, Esq.; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for Respondents Ethel Grimm
Roberts, Rex Roberts and Juanita Grimm Morris.
M. David Eckersley, Esq.; Houpt and Eckersley; Attorneys for Respondent Juanita Kegley Grimm.
Daniel L. Berman, Esq.; Peggy A. Tomsic, Esq.; Berman and O'rorke; Attorneys for Petitioners.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Certiorari, Grimm v. Roberts, No. 900082.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2869

This Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KF'1
45.9
.S9
DOCKul NO.

BRIM".

4)00092
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of
EDWARD MILLER GRIMM,
Deceased.
MAXINE TATE GRIMM, individually
and as Supervised Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Edward Miller Grimm; LINDA
GRIMM; EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II;
and E. LAVAR TATE, as Supervised
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm,
Plaintiffs-Petitioners,

NO,

fS6WA-

COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 880708-CA

vs
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, REX ROBERTS,
JUANITA GRIMM MORRIS, and
JUANITA KEGLEY GRIMM,
Defendants-Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

R. Brent Stephens, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place
Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Respondents
Ethel Grimm Roberts, Rex
Roberts and Juanita Grimm
Mo r r i s

Daniel L. Berman, Esq,
Peggy A. Tomsic, Esq.
BERMAN & O'RORKE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Petitioners

M. David Eckersley, Esq.
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorneys for Respondent,
Juanita Kegley Grimm

FEB 1 0 two
Clerk, Supreme Court. Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
EDWARD MILLER GRIMM,
Deceased.
MAXINE TATE GRIMM, individually
and as Supervised Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Edward Miller Grimm; LINDA
GRIMM; EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II;
and E. LAVAR TATE, as Supervised
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm,
Plaintiffs-Petitioners,

NO,
COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 880708-CA

vs.
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, REX ROBERTS,
JUANITA GRIMM MORRIS, and
JUANITA KEGLEY GRIMM,
Defendants-Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

R. Brent Stephens, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place
Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Respondents
Ethel Grimm Roberts, Rex
Roberts and Juanita Grimm
Morris
M. David Eckersley, Esq.
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent,
Juanita Kegley Grimm

Daniel L. Berman, Esq.
Peggy A. Tomsic, Esq.
BERMAN & O'RORKE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Petitioners

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1

OPINIONS BELOW

2

JURISDICTION

2

GOVERNING PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

11

A.

B,

The Court Of Appeals Totally Disregarded
The Plain Language Of The Uniform Probate
Code And This Court's Decision In Chasel, • •

11

The Court Of Appeals' Denial of
Petitioners' Right To Trial By Jury
On The Issues Of Duress And Failure Of
Consideration Is Contrary To This
Court's Decision In International
Harvester Credit Corp. And Violates
Petitioners' Constitutional Right To
Trial By Jury

18

CONCLUSION

20

(i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

Beacon T h e a t r e s , I n c . v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959)

18,19

DaCanav v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978) . .

15

Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). . . .

19

Georgevich v. Strauss, 96 F.R.D. 192, 197
(M.D.Pa. 1982), aff'd in part and vacated on
other grounds. 722 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985)

15

In re Peck's Estate, 34 N.W. 2d 533 (Mich. 1948). . .

17

In the Matter of the Estate of Frank Chasel, 725
P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986)
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer
Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah
1981)
Mackav v. Kerr-McGee, 312 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. App.

11,15,16
1,2,18-20

1984)

15

Sundguist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981). . .

16

Vece v. DeBiase, 197 N.E.2d 79 (111. App. 1964),
app. disrod., 202 N.E.2d 482 (111. 1964)

15

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10

3,18

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2

2

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-912

3,12,16-18

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101

1,2,4,6,
11-18

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1102

1,3,4,6,
11-14,16-18

OTHER AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Annotation, Family Settlement of Testator's
Estate, 29 A.L.R.33 8 (1970)

18

15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement, §§ 2, 8

15

4 Scott on Trusts, § 337.2.

16

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 337

16,17

(iii)

INTRODUCTION
This Pol it ion seeks t* review a decision ot the Court of
Appeals disregarding the plain language of sections 1101 and 1102 of
the Uniform Probate Code, the uniform state of authority adhering to
the Rule that settlement agreements of all types which by law are
subject to court approval must be approved before the settlements are
binding on the parties and dismissing the view of this Court on the
precise issue in question as "dictum*

The court below, sweeping

aside legislative direction and uniform authority to the contrary,
held that a family settlement agreement materially altering a
spendthrift trust was butdinij m r on I I iiinjii il had been categorically
repudiated over five years before Respondents even attempted to
secure the court approval required by the Uniform Probate Code.
This Petition

further seeks I

review thr I'ouit of Appeals'

denial of Petitioners' constitutional right to trial by jury on the
issues of duress and failure of consideration which Petitioners
presented

lor t i i a 1 a

claims In sit

aaidt

I lit* f tnu I ^ settlement

agreement and as affirmative defenses to Respondents' counterclaim
for $10,000,000 in damages for breach of contract in flat disregard
of this C m i r t ' * idopf i mi t il II n

I ciioi a 1 i u 11 on II HJ r i qht to jury

trial in International Harvester Credit Corp, v. Pioneer Tractor &
Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether under the Uniform Probate Code a family

settlement agreement materially altering and terminating the
inalienable interest

cieated under a spendthrift

trust is, prior to

court approval, binding and enforceable or subject to repudiation by
the trustee and beneficiaries of the f rust.

2.

When the same issues as to the validity of a contract,

duress and failure of consideration, are presented both as equitable
claims for rescission and as affirmative defenses to a counterclaim
for $10,000,000 for breach of the contract, are petitioners entitled
to trial by jury on those issues under this Court's decision in
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement,
Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981).
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals has been reported in
Grimm, et al. v. Roberts, et al., 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Ut. Ct. App.
1989) and is set forth verbatim in the appendix to this Petition.
(A-l) .

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment

entered by the district court have not been reported but are set forth
verbatim in the appendix to this Petition. (A-2, A-3, respectively).
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals by writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a)
and (5), and Rules 42 and 43(2), (3) and (4), Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.

The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was entered on

December 29, 1989.-

On January 5, 1990, this Court granted

Petitioners an extension of time to February 28, 1990 to file this
Petition.

(Order, dated January 5, 1990).
GOVERNING PROVISIONS

The sections of the Uniform Probate Code requiring court approval of a family settlement agreement are Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101

1*
The Court of Appeals originally entered its Opinion on
December 20, 19 89, but then entered an Amended Opinion on
December 29, 1989.
-2-

and 75-3-1102,

The Court of Appeals, in holding court approval of the

family settlement agreement was not required, relied on section 912 of
the Uniform Probate Code.

The right to trial by jury in civil cases

is governed by Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution.

Those

statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth verbatim in the
appendix to this Petition.

(A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, respectively).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Petition arises out of a consolidated action relating to
the estate of Edward Miller Grimm.

Plaintiffs in the consolidated

action were Mr. Grimm's wife, Maxine Grimm, their two children, Pete
and Linda Grimm, and E. LaVar Tate, Mrs. Grimm's brother and hsr
co-executor of what is referred to as Mr. Grimm's non-Philippine will
("Petitioners").

Defendants were two children of Mr. Grimm's first

marriage, Juanita Morris and Ethel Roberts, Mr. Grimm's first wife,
Juanita Grimm, and Rex Roberts, the second husband of Ethel Roberts
("Respondents-).

The fundamental issue in the consolidated action was

the validity of a family settlement agreement that materially altered
Mr. Grimm's estate plan, including a spendthrift trust he set up to
provide for the maintenance and support of his wife Maxine to whom he
had been married for over 30 years ("FSA").

The FSA was entered into

on April 25, 1978, less than six months after Mr. Grimm's death, by
(1) Mr. Grimm's widow Maxine and their two children, Pete and Linda,
and (2) Mr. Grimm's first wife, Juanita Grimm, and her two children,
Ethel Roberts and Juanita Morris.
The first of the consolidated actions was initiated on May 16,
1980 in the Third District Court of Tooele County by Ethel Roberts and
Juanita Morris filing a probate petition to remove Maxine Grimm and
LaVar Tate as the personal representatives of Mr. Grimm's estate.

Defendants' petition did not seek or request in any way that the court
approve the FSA or that Mr. Grimm's estate be distributed in
2/
accordance with the FSA. (PR. 84-81).—
Maxine and LaVar filed an answer and counterclaim in the
probate proceeding on September 10, 1980 and simultaneously they and
Maxine's two children, Pete and Linda, (Petitioners) commenced a civil
action against Juanita Grimm, Juanita Morris, Ethel and Rex Roberts
(Respondents).

The counterclaim and complaint essentially stated

parallel claims for relief and, in addition, the complaint stated a
claim on behalf of Maxine for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

(PR. 236-152; CR. 101-1).

A number of the separate claims

in Petitioners' pleadings attacked the validity of the FSA on numerous
grounds, including that the FSA was of no further force and effect
because it had been repudiated before it was ever submitted for court
approval as required under sections 75-3-1101 and 1102 of the Uniform
Probate Code, that the FSA was void from.its inception because it
materially altered and terminated a spendthrift trust, and that the
FSA was invalid by reason of duress and failure of consideration,
(id.).

The civil action and probate proceeding were consolidated on

January 20, 1981.
Respondents never sought court approval of the FSA until many
years after Petitioners categorically repudiated the FSA.

Respondents

never in any way sought court approval of the FSA until they obtained

2.
The Tooele County Clerk's office continued to maintain
separate files in the probate and civil actions after consolidation
and has paginated and indexed those two separate records pursuant to
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Citations to the
record will refer to "PR." for original papers filed, indexed and
paginated by the Clerk's office in the probate action and "CR." for
the civil action.
-4-

leave to file an amended answer and counterclaim on February 13, 1985,
more than four years after they initiated their probate petition and
more than five years after Petitioners had clearly and unequivocally
repudiated the FSA.- 7

(CR. 362, 373-72; PR. 1638-28)-

Respondents'

counterclaim also asserted a $10,000,00*0 breach of contract claim
against Petitioners.

(PR. 1633-32)

Petitioners again set up duress

and failure of consideration as affirmative defenses in reply to the
breach of contract claim.

(CR. 948-41).

Petitioners timely demanded trial by jury on all issues of law,
including duress and failure of consideration.

(CR. 873-71; July 26,

30, 1985 TR. at 22). Respondents objected and, after briefing and
argument, the district court issued the following bench ruling:
I never questioned the right to your trial by jury for legal
issues. There's no problem with that . . .
We can impanel a
jury, but the court will still make the ultimate decision as
to whether the contracts are valid or invalid. Then the jury
can decide on the legal issues.
The court will make the decision and have the jury sit through
the whole case, hear the issues with regard to duress,
coercion as to how they apply, if we get beyond the
determination of whether or not the contracts are valid. That
is the first issue. . . . (July 26, 30, 1985 TR. at 19).
Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a jury trial,
but so that everybody understands, the court will make the
decision as to whether or not the family settlement agreement
is valid or invalid, and then based upon that you may proceed
on your counterclaim — you may not proceed, but at that time
the plaintiffs here cannot say that they didn't have the right
for the jury to hear all of the defenses with regard to
coercion, duress and other defenses. . . . (Id. at 23)
(emphasis added).

3.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Respondents
sought court approval in 1983, it is uncontroverted that Respondents
did not obtain leave to file their amended answer and counterclaim,
which is the first pleading in which they sought court approval,
until February 13, 1985. (CR. 362, 373-372). In any event, even if
Respondents sought court approval in 1983, it is clear the FSA had
been repudiated years before court approval was ever sought.

Trial commenced on August 6, 1985 before a jury.

(TRA. 3 ) . —

After nine days of trial, the district court, without giving any
reasons, ruled in favor of Respondents and against Petitioners, and
dismissed the jury.

(TRB. 1125).

Eight months later, the district court entered its findings of
fact and conclusions of law and judgment,

(CR. 1258-31)-

The judgment

simply approved the FSA pursuant to sections 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102 of
the Uniform Probate Code and summarily denied all other claims for
relief.

(CR. 1258-55).

The court decided all issues with regard to

duress and failure of consideration.

(CR. 1253, 1240, 1235-34).

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held with regard to the
questions presented in this Petition:

(1) That court approval of the

FSA was not required under sections 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform
Probate Code and that the FSA was not subject to repudiation in the
absence of fraud, duress and failure of consideration; and (2) That
Petitioners were not entitled to trial by jury on the issues of duress
and failure of consideration on the ground those issues went to the
-validity" of the FSA and were "clearly equitable".

(A-l).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Edward Miller Grimm died on November 27, 1977 in Manila,
Republic of the Philippines.

(TRA. 9 ) . Mr. Grimm was an American

citizen and maintained residences both in the Philippines and Tooele,
Utah.

(TRA. 9; CR. 1252).

4.
The transcript of the trial was transcribed by two different
reporters* The first reporter transcribed the first 3 volumes of
the transcript and paginated the transcript from page 1 in Volume I
to page 527 in Volume III. The second reporter transcribed the
remaining 6 volumes of the transcript and paginated those volumes
from page 1 in Volume IV to page 1127 in Volume IX. The first 3
volumes of the transcript are referred to as "TRA." and the last 6
volumes of the transcript as "TRB."
-6-

Mr. Grimm was survived by his wife of 30 years, Maxine Grimm,
and their two children Linda and Pete Grimm and by two children of a
prior marriage, Ethel Roberts and Juanita Morris ("Nita").
At the time of his death, Mr. Grimm left an estate worth over
$8,000,000.

(DX-272).

He disposed of his estate under an inter vivos

spendthrift trust and two wills, one which disposed of all his
property located in the Philippines and one which disposed of all his
property situated outside the Philippines.

(PX-6, 7, 11). The trust

categorically precluded transfer or hypothecation of any beneficiary's
interest in the income or principal of the trust.

(PX-11 at 9 ) .

There is no question Mr. Grimm's trust was a valid spendthrift
trust.

Neither the trial court or the Court of Appeals made any

findings or determinations to the contrary.

(CR. 1254-31; A-l).

Indeed, the uncontroverted evidence established the spendthrift trust
was valid.
(PX-11).

Mr. Grimm executed the written trust on July 12, 1977.

On the same day, he executed and delivered a written

assignment of his stock in Globe Investment Company to the trustee of
the spendthrift trust.

(PX-11; TRB. 440-42).

Globe Investment

Company reissued Mr. Grimm's stock in the name of the trustee, the
reissued stock was delivered to the trustee and the stock transfer was
reflected in the stock ledger of Globe.

(PX-12, 13). The Globe stock,

was a substantial asset worth approximately $2,000,000 when Mr. Grimm
died in November of 1977.

(DX-272).

In addition to the initial

transfer of Globe stock, Mr. Grimm made numerous other written,
verified assignments of assets to the trust when he and his son
returned to the Philippines in August of 1977.
449-50).

(PX-14-55; TRB. 444,

There is no question those assignments were executed and

delivered to the trustee.

(TRB. 448-50).

It is uncontroverted Mr.

Grimm was competent when he executed the trust and executed and
delivered the written assignments of his assets to the trustee.

(TRA.

44, 480-82; TRB. 442-43, 448-49).
Under Mr. Grimm's estate plan, 88.6% of Mr. Grimm's entire
estate was dedicated to his wife Maxine's maintenance and support.
(PX-169E).

Mr. Grimm gave 50% of the trust assets to Maxine and 50%

to Pete and Linda, with Pete and Linda's share being available for
Maxine's support and maintenance.

(PX-169D, 169J).

Mr. Grimm also

gave Pete and Linda 50% of his estate under the non-Philippine will
and 23% under the Philippine will.

(PX-169J).

Mr. Grimm only left

Ethel and Nita 3.7% of his total assets under the trust and two wills
pursuant to the Philippine will.

(PX-169H).

In dollars, Ethel and

Nita were each to receive $96,423 under Mr. Grimm's estate plan, while
$4,623,657 was dedicated to the support of his widow Maxine.
(PX-169B).

$3,674,876 of that amount was protected by the spendthrift

clause of the trust.

(PX-169).

On April 25, 1978, less than six months after Mr. Grimm's
death, Maxine, Pete and Linda Grimm entered into the FSA with Ethel
and Nita and their mother, Juanita Grimm.

(PX-58, 59). It is uncon-

troverted the FSA materially altered Mr. Grimm's estate plan and, in
particular, altered and terminated the spendthrift trust*

The FSA

explicitly made the trust and its assets subject to the FSA.

(PX-59

at 1 ) . The FSA gave Ethel and Nita 25% of the net estate instead of
3.7% which their father chose to give them, increasing their share
from $192,846 to $1,277,038 and giving them substantially more than
Pete and Linda.
654-55).

(PX-58 at 8; PX-59, 169B, 169C; TRB. 65-66,

Maxine was required to pay Nita and Ethel whatever amount

was necessary "so that each of them will receive an amount equal to
-8-

twelve and one-half percent (12 1/2%) of the total of the net
distributable estate and marital share."
65-66, 654-55).

(PX-58 at 8; PX-59; TRB.

As a consequence, assets Mr. Grimm had placed in

trust for the care and maintenance of Maxine were transferred and
redistributed to Ethel and Nita under the FSA.
1).

(PX-58 at 8; PX-59 at

There is simply no other source for the additional $1,000,000

that Ethel and Nita picked up under the FSA.
169B).

(Compare PX-169C with

But the FSA did not merely require property placed in the

spendthrift trust by Mr. Grimm to be transferred to Ethel and Nita.
The FSA displaced the trust and, contrary to Mr. Grimm's desires, his
property was distributed not in trust, not with the protection of the
spendthrift clause for his beneficiaries, but directly to the parties
to the FSA, including Maxine, Pete and Linda.

(PX-58, 59).

Maxine, Linda and Pete unequivocally repudiated the FSA five
years before it was ever submitted to the court for approval.

(TRA.

208-11, 443-46, 468-69; TRB. 424-25, 504-05; DX-283; PX-173).

They

repudiated the FSA orally, in writing and by filing the civil action,
(id.).

Both lower courts acknowledged that the FSA was repudiated

long before it was ever submitted to the court for approval.

(CR.

1236; A-l at 6, 11-12).
There was ample evidence, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged,
from which a jury could have determined that the FSA was the product
of duress and without adequate consideration.

(A-l at 15). After Mr.

Grimm's death, Ethel and Rex undertook a calculated campaign to
illegally gain control of Mr. Grimm's estate and to intimidate Maxine
into signing a settlement giving Ethel and Nita significantly more
than their father had chosen to give them under his estate plan.

That calculated campaign included outrageous conduct on the
part of the Roberts.

While Maxine was in Tooele, Utah burying her

husband, Ethel illegally secured her appointment as special administratrix to gain control of Mr. Grimm's estate in the Philippines by
filing a perjurious verified petition alleging her father had died
intestate and Maxine was not a resident of the Philippines.

(TRA.

75-80, 501-09, 523-24; TRB. 15; PX-73, 77, 79, 81). Both allegations
were false and Ethel knew they were false.

(Id.)-

While Maxine was

still in the United States, the Roberts broke into Maxine's home in
the Philippines and took valuable contents of safes and Maxine's personal papers, including her credit cards and check book.
TRA. 113-115; TRB. 20-24, 636-37).

(PX-82, 85;

When Maxine demanded Ethel relin-

quish her illegal appointment and return Maxine"s property, (PX-88),
Ethel and her husband refused, telling Maxine they would not do so
until Maxine signed the FSA.

(TRA. 118; TRB. 11-12, 639-41; DX-214) .

Ethel and her husband attempted to achieve their demand for more
by repeatedly threatening to claim Mr. Grimm's first divorce was
illegal and Maxine's marriage invalid, to go to the authorities and
expose Mr. Grimm's tax problems, and to work against Maxine so as to
jeopardize the estate's 50% interest in Mr. Grimm's major businesses.
(TRA 122-23; TRB. 466-72, 236-37; PX-95).
Ethel and Nita, however, did not have a bona fide claim to
participate in their father's estate beyond his wishes.
divorce was valid.

Mr. Grimm's

Their mother had been divorced from Mr. Grimm for

over 30 years in a contested divorce proceeding in which she appeared
and was represented by counsel.

(PX-1, 2, 3 ) . No good faith argument

could be made that her divorce from Mr. Grimm was subject to collateral
attack.

(DX-250, 252; TRB. 310, 909-10).

Mr. Grimm's wills and trust

were valid and Respondents themselves admitted his competency.

(PX-6,

7, 11; TRA. 480, 482), Respondents simply did not have a claim for more.
Indeed, at trial the Roberts and their lawyer unequivocally
testified that prior to the execution of the FSA they made no bona fide
claim against Mr. Grimm's estate.

(TRB. 52, 55, 651-52, 898-901).

The

Roberts' claims amounted to nothing more than bullying and blackmail.
The Court of Appeals' finding that the parties' lawyers had
prolonged and extensive involvement in the negotiations leading up to
the FSA simply is not true.

The lawyers the parties retained did not

negotiate the basic deal reflected in the FSA and only played a
peripherial role in the settlement negotiations.
245-46, 642, 654-55, 915; PX-174).

(TRB. 236, 240-42,

The basic deal —

Mr, Grimm's estate reflected in the FSA —

the division of

was reached in a series of

approximately 30 meetings and conversations between Ethel, Rex, Maxine
and Pete in the Philippines in late February and March of 1978 after
Maxine returned from Mr. Grimm's funeral in Tooele.
conduct continued to be outrageous during that time.
screamed at Maxine.

(Id.). Ethel's
She swore and

She and Rex would simply show up at Maxine's home

unannounced, walk in and start demanding a greater interest in Mr.
Grimm's estate*

(TRA. 122-23, 125-27; TRB. 472). Maxine finally could

not take anymore and agreed to the FSA.

(TRA. 161-62; PX-9 5).

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT
A.

The Court of Appeals Totally Disregarded The Plain Language Of
The Uniform Probate Code And This Court's Decision In Chasel.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment uphol-

ding the FSA but did so on different grounds than the grounds relied
on by the trial court.

The trial court upheld the FSA by approving it

pursuant to sections 1101 and 1102.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the

trial court on the grounds court approval under sections 1101 and 1102

was not required and the FSA was not subject to repudiation in the
absence of fraud, duress and failure of consideration.

Its theory was

that family settlement agreements are made binding under two separate
statutory provisions of the Uniform Probate Code —
sections 1101-1102.

section 912 and

According to the Court of Appeals, section 912

provides for family settlement agreements to be binding on the parties
to the agreement without court approval, leaving the court approval
requirements of sections 1101 and 1102 applicable only to nonparties,
such as minors and unborn heirs.

(A-l at 6-9).

Certiorari in this case is necessary to resolve the scope and
applicability of the compromise-court approval provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code.

By holding the FSA was binding and valid regard-

less of court approval, the Court of Appeals emasculated the court
approval mechanism of sections 1101 and 1102, defied the clear legislative direction encased in the plain language of those provisions, and
disregarded this Court's direction on the precise question presented.
Sections 1101 and 1102 are the provisions of the Uniform
Probate Code that apply to the settlement of claims in a decedent's
estate.

They apply to all settlements not just some settlements.

plain language of those sections says they apply to all settlements
"A compromise of any controversy . . ."

(§ 75-3-1101) —

The
—

"The

procedure for securing court approval of a compromise is as follows:"
(§ 75-3-1102).

The legislative history of sections 1101 and 1102

confirms they apply to all settlements:

"This section and the one

preceding it [§ 1101] outline a procedure which may be initiated . . .
as a means of resolving controversy concerning the estate."

Editorial

Board Comment § 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis added).
In order for the settlement of claims in a decedent's estate to

be binding, court approval is required.
1101 says so:

The plain language of section

"A compromise of any controversy as to . . . the rights

or interests in the estate of the decedent . . . if approved in a
formal proceeding in the court for that purpose, is binding on all the
parties thereto- . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101 (emphasis added).

The statute does not say the settlement is binding without court
approval.
it.

It does not say it is binding until the court disapproves

The statute means what it says.

Prior to court approval, a

family settlement agreement is not binding and may be repudiated.
Court approval, contrary to the Court of Appeals' rationale, is
necessary to make the FSA binding on parties and nonparties alike.
That requirement again is reflected in the plain language, approval
structure and legislative history of sections 1101 and 1102.

Section

1101 explicitly states a settlement Mif approved . . . is binding on
all of the parties thereto . . ."
1102 requires that:

The approval structure of section

"The terms of the compromise shall be set forth

in an agreement in writing which shall be executed by all competent
persons . . . w , not just minors, unborn heirs and those with
inalienable interests.
added).

Utah Code A m u §§ 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis

The plain language of the statute is reinforced by the

legislative history of those sections:

"If all competent persons with

beneficial interests or claims which might be affected by the proposal
• • • concur, a settlement scheme differing from that otherwise
governing the distribution may be substituted.-

Editorial Board

Comment, § 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis added).
There are sound policy reasons for requiring court approval of
a family settlement agreement before that settlement is binding on the
parties and not subject to repudiation.

Sections 1101 and 1102 were

added to the Uniform Probate Code in 19 69 to deal with compromises
altering the desires and intentions of the testator.

The public policy

behind those provisions, as reflected in their legislative history, is
to respect the desires of the testator in the absence of the
concurrence of his intended beneficiaries and approval of the court:
"The only reason for approving a scheme of devolution which differs
from that framed by the testator . . . is to prevent dissipation of the
estate in wasteful litigation. . . . A controversy which the court may
find to be in good faith, as well as concurrence of all beneficially
interested and competent persons and parent-representatives provide
prerequisites which should prevent the procedure from being abused.M
Editorial Board Comment, §§ 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis added).
the prerequisites —
should control.

concurrence and approval —

Without

the testator's wishes

Indeed, when the intended beneficiaries do not concur,

there simply is no foundation for court approval of a settlement agreement materially altering the testator's estate plan and the intent of
the testator should be effectuated.

If the intended beneficiaries

repudiate the family settlement agreement prior to court approval, the
court should not be permitted to override the testator's desires and
write a new estate plan for the disposition of his property.
The plain language of sections 1101 and 1102 is supported by the
uniform rule in every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue of
whether a settlement which by law is subject to court approval can be
repudiated prior to court approval.

The uniform rule across the board

is those settlements may be repudiated at any time prior to court
approval.

That rule is uniformly followed in all types of settlements

which by law are subject to court approval.

It has been applied to

class action settlements subject to court approval under Rule 23(e),
-14-

Georqevich v. Strauss, 96 F.R.D. 192, 197 (M.D.Pa. 1982), aff'd in part
and vacated on other grounds, 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985); to workman's compensation settlements, Mackav v. Kerr-McGee, 312 S.E.2d 565
(S.C. App. 1984); guardian ad litem settlements, DaCanav v. Mendoza,
573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978); and will contest settlements requiring
probate approval, Vece v. DeBiase, 197 N.E.2d 79 (111. App. 1964), app.
dismd., 202 N.E.2d 482 (111. 1964).

The Rule is so settled that it is

reflected in Encyclopedias, 15A C.J.S. Compromise 8c Settlement, §§ 2 at
176 —

"Where a party repudiates the compromise agreement before it is

approved or confirmed by the court . . . the court should not confirm
the agreement.M
The Court of Appeals did not even discuss or attempt to
distinguish this clearly established, uniform line of authority.
A-l) .

The Court of Appeals did not cite one case to the contrary.

(Id,),

The Court of Appeals' failure to cite any authority is no

accident.

(See

There is none.

Moreover, this Court has expressed its view that a family
settlement agreement is not binding prior to court approval.

In In the

Matter of the Estate of Frank Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986), there
was an attempt to set aside a settlement agreement after court approval
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101.

In holding that a family

settlement agreement could not be set aside after court approval, this
Court said:

"compromise agreements authorized by Part II of the

Probate Code must be approved in formal proceedings.H 725 P.2d at 1348
5/
(emphasis added).The corollary of this Court's language is that

5.
This Court also made the following statement regarding the issue:
"Except for the requirement of court approval and other statutory requirements in Part II, a compromise agreement under the Probate Code is like
other compromise agreements." 725 P. 2d at 1348 (emphasis added).
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if a family settlement agreement is not approved, it is not binding,
hypothetical based on the facts of Chasel makes the point.

A

If William

Chasel had found the new will prior to court approval, would there be
any question he would have been entitled to repudiate the settlement
agreement and present the newly discovered will of his father for
probate?
The Court of Appeals simply dismissed Chasel as "dictum" and
interpreted sections 1101 and 1102 in a way that is totally at odds
with Chasel.

(A-l at 6-7). Under its interpretation, if William

Chasel had found his father's new will before court approval, he would
not have been entitled to repudiate the settlement agreement and
present his father's will for probate.

That is not what this Court

directed in Chasel.
Even if the Court of Appeals' division of enforceability of
family settlement agreements between section 912 and sections 1101 and
1102 made sense, it does not matter in this case.

If the FSA was not

subject to the approval provisions of sections 1101 and 1102, the FSA
was invalid and void at its inception because it materially altered and
terminated a spendthrift trust.
The unchallenged rule is that beneficiaries of a trust may not
materially alter or terminate a trust if such termination or alteration would frustrate a material purpose of the trust.

Sundguist v.

Sundguist, 639 P.2d 181, 187 (Utah 1981); Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 337(2).

This rule has been uniformly applied to preclude the

material alteration or termination of a spendthrift trust.

See

Sundguist, 639 P.2d at 187; Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 337
Comment o; 4 Scott on Trusts, § 337.2.

The conseguence of this rule is

that without court approval a family settlement agreement materially
altering and terminating a spendthrift trust is invalid and unenforceable regardless of repudiation.

Restatement (Second) of Trusts,

§ 337, Comment o.
The only provision of the Uniform Probate Code giving the court
authority to approve a family settlement agreement materially altering
or terminating a spendthrift trust is section 1101.
explicitly provides:

Section 1101

"An approved compromise is binding even though

it may affect a trust or an inalienable interest.H

There is no simi-

lar provision in section 912 or, for that matter, any other section of
the Uniform Probate Code.
The Court of Appeals did not even pretend to come up with any
rationale for its decision.

Instead, it did nothing more than conclude:

We have found the FSA to be a valid contract, even without
court approval. However, the trial court in its judgment
approved the FSA. Under § 75-3-1101, it is thus binding even
though it may affect a trust or an inalienable interest.
(A-l at 1 3 ) . There is simply no logic that would support that conclusion.

The FSA was either subject to the court approval requirements

of sections 1101 and 1102 and therefore not binding prior to court
approval or it was not subject to the court approval provisions of
sections 1101 and 1102 and therefore invalid and void from its
inception because it materially altered and terminated a spendthrift
trust.

The Court of Appeals cannot have it both ways.
Finally, the only purported support the Court of Appeals

mustered up for its position that section 912 is controlling, a 1948
Michigan opinion In re Peck's Estate, 34 N.W. 2d 533 (Mich. 1948), and
an A.L.R. Annotation, plainly and simply are inapposite.
The Michigan statute that was applicable to the In re Peck's
Estate decision was clearly and materially different from the Uniform

Probate Code.

The Michigan statute did not have provisions comparable

to sections 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code.

It only had

one provision and that single provision explicitly limited the need
for court approval to settlement agreements where there were minors,
incapacitated persons or inalienable interests."

Compare Mich. §

27-5191 with Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3-912, 1101, 1102.
The Court of Appeals' reliance on the Annotation, Family
Settlement of Testator's Estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 8, 25, 125 (1970) is
similarly flawed.

The cases in that Annotation simply did not address

statutory provisions, such as the Uniform Probate Code, that required
court approval of family settlement agreements before they were
binding.

They did not address the issue of whether family settlement

agreements may be repudiated prior to court approval.

They did not

deal with a family settlement agreement materially altering a spendthrift trust.
B.

The Court Of Appeals' Denial Of Petitioners' Right To Trial By
Jury On The Issues Of Duress And Failure Of Consideration Is
Contrary To This Court's Decision In International Harvester
Credit Corp. And Violates Petitioners' Constitutional Right To
Trial By Jury.
The right to trial by jury is a right guaranteed by both the Utah

and federal constitutions.

Utah Const., Art. I, § 10; Beacon Theatres,

Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); International Harvester Credit
Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981).
It is a right that is firmly embedded in this nation's legal system.
International Harvester, 626 P.2d at 419-20,

6.
The Court of Appeals lightly brushes off the critical differences
between the Michigan statute and the Uniform Probate Code stating: "We
are persuaded that In re Peck is in point despite slightly different
language in the statutes." (A-l at 8 n.6) (emphasis added). Saying
that the differences are not material does not make it so.
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This Court has adopted the federal rule for determining when
the constitutional right to jury trial applies in civil cases.
International Harvester, supra.

The federal rule and the Utah rule

are that if the same issues are raised both in equitable claims and
legal counterclaims, the constitutional right to jury trial requires
that issues arising in both the equitable and legal claims be tried to
a jury first.

International Harvester, supra.; Dairy Queen, Inc. v.

Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1962); Beacon Theatres, supra.
The Court of Appeals simply disregarded the rule adopted by
this Court and held that Petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial
on the issues of duress and failure of consideration because
Respondents put on no evidence in support of their claim for damages
in their counterclaim, and hence, such affirmative defenses became
moot.M

(A-l at 13). The Court of Appeals got it backwards.

The

right to a jury trial is determined by the claims and issues submitted
for trial under the pleadings and pretrial order, not by what happens
after trial commences.
after the trial begins.

You do not lose the right to trial by jury
Once Respondents asserted the breach of

contract counterclaim and proceeded to trial on that claim,
Petitioners had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the issues
7/
of duress and failure of consideration.—
Certiorari in this case is necessary to resolve the scope of
the constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases guaranteed by
Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Utah Constitution.

Under the rationale of the

Court of Appeals' decision, it is as if this Court's decision in
7.
The issues of duress and failure of consideration can be tried
with Petitioners' claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress which the Court of Appeals has remanded for a jury trial.
(A-l, at 13-18).

International Harvester never existed.

The Court of Appeals' decision

will generate substantial uncertainty concerning the Utah law on the
constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases.

Courts and

practitioners need to know what the scope of that constitutional right
is .
The administration of a sound certiorari policy requires this
Court to take certiorari when the Court of Appeals disregards the
plain language of Utah statutes and decisions of this Court.

Because

of the backlog of cases, this Court is pouring over virtually all
civil appeals to the Court of Appeals.

The degree to which this Court

must rely on the Court of Appeals is all the more reason the Court of
Appeals needs to follow this Court's decisions and the legislative
directive embodied in the language of State statutes.
CONCLUSION
This Petition presents important questions of state law which
the Court of Appeals erroneously decided contrary to the Utah
Constitution, the plain language of the Uniform Probate Code, opinions
of this Court and unanimous authority from other jurisdictions.
Court should review that erroneous decision.

Petitioners therefore

respectfully request their Petition be granted.
DATED:

February

VI

1990.
BERMtfN St Of'ROR

Pegg]
Suite~L250
50 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 328-2200
Attorneys for Petitioners
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R. Brent Stephens, Esq.
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